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Abstract. We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is
optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving
this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria
where no player has an incentive to deviate from her strategy. We argue that a
player with the power to define an equilibrium is in a position, where she should
not be interested in the symmetry of a Nash equilibrium, and ignore the question
of whether or not her outcome can be improved if the other strategies are fixed.
That is, she would only have to make sure that the other players have no incentive
to deviate. This defines a greater class of equilibria, which may have better (and
cannot have worse) optimal equilibria for the designated powerful player. We
apply this strategy to concurrent bimatrix games and to turn based multi-player
mean-payoff games. For the latter, we show that such political equilibria as well
as Nash equilibria always exist, and provide simple examples where the political
equilibrium is superior. We show that constructing political and Nash equilibria
are NP-complete problems. We also show that, for a fixed number of players, the
hardest part is to solve the underlying two-player mean-payoff games: using an
MPG oracle, the problem is solvable in polynomial time. It is therefore in UP
and CoUP, and can be solved in pseudo polynomial and expected subexponential
time.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibria [17, 15, 22, 18, 8] are a common way to describe stable strategies with
the intuition that only if no player gains from changing her strategy unilaterally, the
strategy will be maintained. In this paper, we raise the question of how an interested
party, called dictator in the remainder, can capitalise on setting an equilibrium strategy.
How should a selfish agent design the rules if she has a chance to do so?
In response to this, the policy of the dictator is to optimise her payoff by chosing
a strategy she could improve upon. This conceptual contribution can quite simply be
demonstrated by the following concurrent bimatrix games, which are extensions of the
prisoners dilemma. Prisoner I takes the role of the dictator in our examples.
The first game is defined by the left bimatrix shown in Table 1. Both prisoners have
the common options to co-operate with (C) or defect (D) the police. If both defect,
they will be sentenced for minor crimes (receiving a one year sentence, reflected by a
payoff of −1). If both co-operate, they receive an eight year sentence. If one prisoner
co-operates while the other prisoner defects, the defector expects a ten year sentence,
while the co-operator will receive a key witness status and won’t be charged. Prisoner I,
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Table 1. Payoff matrices; the upper left / lower right values refer to Prioner I / II.
however, has a third option, where she can play politically (P) by commit to some of the
crimes, but (with the help of her expensive lawyer) in a way that the charge is not a full
one. In this case, Prisoner I will receive a charge of five years if Prisoner II defects, and
a charge of nine years if she co-operates. Prisoner II will receive an eight year sentence
either way (in case of defection as a beneficiary of the defence strategy of Prisoner I).
In this case, the only Nash equilibrium is (as in the classic prisoners dilemma) that
both prisoners co-operate. The optimal political equilibrium for Prisoner I, however, is
to play politically (P), while Prisoner II defects (D). This strategy yields a payoff of
(−5,−8) and is an (optimal) political equilibrium, because the other prisoner does not
have any incentive to deviate from the strategy assigned to her by the dictator, but it is
not a Nash equilibrium, as Prisoner I has an incentive to deviate, both to C and to D.
(For all other dictator strategies, co-operating is the only optimal counter strategy of
Prisoner II.)
In the right matrix, the only difference is that Prisoner II benefits fully from the
defence strategy of Prisoner I when Prisoner I plays P. In this case, Prisoner I has a
mixed optimal equilibrium, namely to play D with a 34 , and P with a
1
4 probability,
while assigning Prisoner II the pure strategy to defect. This optimal policital equilibrium
yields a payoff of (−2,−2). (Note that C/C remains the only Nash equilibrium, as
Prisoner I will still, for all strategies of Prisoner II, benefit most from co-operating, and
the best response of Prisoner II to a co-operating Prisoner I remains to play C).
Application in mean-payoff games. In the remainder, we focus on the application of
political equilibria in turn based mean-payoff games. Mean-payoff games (MPGs) [24,
11, 9, 2, 19, 3, 6] are finite turn-based games of infinite duration. They are played on a
game arena, a directed graph, whose vertices are owned by different players. An MPG
is played by placing a token on a vertex, and allowing the player who owns the vertex to
push the token forward along an edge in the arena. Thus, the players successively create
an infinite play. The edges of the game hold rewards for each player, and the objective
of each player is to maximise her average reward.
The way each individual player plays can be captured by a strategy, and a set of
strategies, one for each player, is called a strategy profile. A strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium if no player has an incentive for unilateral deviation: if all other players
stick to their strategy, she cannot increase her payoff by changing hers.
In mean-payoff games, it is simple to think of scenarios where the power of the
players is not symmetric. Think, for example, of a client-server scenario, where the
server provides a service and can therefore dictate the rules. One may also think of
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political processes, where rules are laid down in laws, bylaws, conditions of service, or
just a social etiquette. It seems natural that players in the position to change these rules
have a greater power over defining an equilibrium.
Apart from this natural motivation, it is always reasonable to ask which equilibrium
is best, be it for an individual player or for society. Especially if we seek the optimal
strategy of an individual player (the dictator), it does not seem natural to restrict her
choice of a strategy any further than necessary.
An arguably necessary restriction is that no other player has an incentive to devi-
ate from the strategy defined, just as it is wont in Nash equilibria. But if we allow the
dictator to select strategies that she can improve over, we give her more leeway when
selecting a strategy profile. We therefore argue that we should allow her to ‘discrimi-
nate’ against herself. In consequence, the dictator may assign strategy profiles in such
a way that she could improve over the outcome provided that the other players stick to
the strategy she has assigned to them.
As we will show in Section 3.1, the dictator may suffer from restricting her strat-
egy in the Nash sense. In our opinion, there is no convincing reason why she should
constraint her strategies in this way. Note that the society may be viewed as a player
without moves, such that the interest of society can be viewed as a special case.
Results. The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of the concept of polit-
ical equilibria. We believe that political equilibria are a natural question that arise when
we seek to construct a stable strategy assignment.
If we start with the question of Nash equilibria, a natural follow-up question is which
Nash equilibrium we should choose in scenarios where there are many. Choosing the
optimal Nash equilibrium for one of the players seem to be a very natural question.
Once this question is asked, a very natural follow-up question is why we should
restrict the moves of this designated player unnecessarily. When we give this player the
defining power over the equilibrium, any restriction that aim at her interests is either
void or harmful. The natural consequence is to lift all of these restrictions in order to
provide her with as much leeway as possible.
For multi-player mean-payoff games (MMPGs), we provide additional contribu-
tions. We show that (unsurprisingly) the complexity of finding optimal political equi-
libria equals the complexity of finding Nash equilibria. We show that optimal equilibria
always exists. The complexity of finding a given Nash equilibrium is known to be NP
complete [23]. We show that NP completeness (unsurprisingly) extends to optimal equi-
libria, and sharpen this bound by showing that they cannot be approximised. We also
show that hardness depends on the number of players: for a bounded number of players,
we give a polynomial time reduction to solving 2 player mean-payoff games (2MPGs).
As the complexity of solving 2MPGs is wide open, we cannot hope for determining
the precise complexity for solving MMPGs with a bounded number of players without
establishing the complexity of solving 2MPGs. However, we get simple corollaries for
the complexity of finding political and Nash equilibria for a bounded number of players:
this can be done in pseudo polynomial time [6], this can be done in smoothed polyno-
mial time [3], there are fast randomised [2] and deterministic [19] strategy improvement
algorithms, and the decision problem is in UP∩CoUP [11, 24]. This reduction hinges on
the fact that very simple strategies, to which we refer to as reward and punish strategies,
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suffice. Reward and punish strategies essentially dictate a play of the game. Upon de-
viation, the game turns into a two-player game (hence the reduction), where the player
who deviates first will henceforth play against the remaining players.
Finally, we discuss how to use our results to find equilibria that are best for society
rather than egoistic ones that suit only a single player.
Related Work. The existence of Nash equilibria has recently been established by Bri-
haye, Bruye`re, and De Pril [4]. Their proof has been significantly simplified and the
existence of very simple strategies has been established in [5]. Our reward and punish
strategy profiles are inspired by the simple strategies used in [5] and similar strategies
in stateless games [26].
The existence of Nash equilibria in multi-player mean-payoff games has been es-
tablished in [25]. Ummels and Wojtczak [23] studied the complexity of determining
the existence of Nash equilibria, where each reward falls into a given closed interval in
multi-player mean-payoff games. Both sides of the NP completenss proofs are closely
related to ours. In [21], Ummels has studied the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium
in case of infinite games. He has given simple examples to show that subgame perfect
equilibrium, where choice of strategy should be such that it is optimal for initial history
of the game and not for just initial vertex, exists in the case of infinite games.
There are quite a few works on optimal equilibria, in particular on equilibria that
are ‘best for society’, which is usually defined as the optimal sum. This definiton is, for
example, used in the definition of the price of Anarchy [14] for network and internet
related games, or in traffic routing games [1, 10]. In [16], the authors study a virus inoc-
ulation game on social networks, in which players think of their neighbour’s welfare. In
[7], the authors have modelled a society game and shown how the equilibria are affected
if players think of society rather than thinking of themselves.
2 Preliminaries
A multi-player mean-payoff game (MMPG) is a tuple 〈P, V, {Vp | p ∈ P}, v0, E, {rp :
E → Q | p ∈ P}〉, where P is a set of players, V is a set of vertices with a designated
initial vertex v0 ∈ V , {Vp | p ∈ P} is a partition of the vertices V , E ⊆ V × V is
a set of edges, such that each vertex has a successor (∀v ∈ V ∃v′ ∈ V, (v, v′) ∈ E),
and {rp | p ∈ P} is a family of reward functions rp : E → Q, that assign, for each
respective player p, a reward for each transition to p.
An MMPG is intuitively played by placing a token on the initial vertex. Each time
the token is in the vertex of a player p, player p chooses an outgoing transition and
moves the token along this transition. This way, the players jointly construct an infinite
play pi ∈ V ω . For each player p, a play pi = v0, v1 . . . is evaluated to
rp(pi) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
rp
(
(vi, vi+1)
)
.
If the reward functions sum up to 0 (
∑
p∈P
rp(e) = 0 holds for all edges e ∈ E), then
we call the MMPG a zero-sum game.
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The way that the respective players choose the successor vertex is a function σp :
V ∗Vp → V from an initial sequence of a play that ends in some vertex v ∈ Vp of player
p to a vertex v′, such that (v, v′) ∈ E. A family of strategies σ = {σp | p ∈ P} is
called a strategy profile. A strategy profile σ defines a unique play piσ , and therefore a
reward rp(σ) = rp(piσ) for each player p.
A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to change her
strategy, provided that all other player keep theirs. That is, for all players p ∈ P and for
all σ′ = {σ′q | q ∈ P} with σq = σ′q for all q 6= p, rp(σ) ≥ rp(σ′) holds.
A strategy profile is a political equilibrium for a designated player d (for dictator), if
no other player has an incentive to deviate her strategy. That is, for all players p ∈ P r
{d} and for all σ′ = {σ′q | q ∈ P} with σq = σ′q for all q 6= p, rp(σ) ≥ rp(σ′) holds.
Thus, a political equilibrium allows for solutions, where the dictator could improve
upon her reward by changing her strategy. While this may on first glance not be in the
interest of a dictator, we will see that she can obtain better results with political than
with Nash equilibria.
Two player mean-payoff games (2MPGs) can be viewed as a special case of multi-
player mean-payoff games, where only two-players participate. 2MPGs are used in
this paper to determine the outcome of MMPGs when, from some point onwards,
one player, say p, is playing against all others, where the objective of p is inherited
from a multi-player MPG, while the objective of the remaining players is to minimise
her reward. As the objective of the remaining players is defined by the objective of p,
we use only rp to describe the objective of the game. The 2MPG for p of an MMPG
M = 〈P, V, {Vp | p ∈ P}, v0, E, {rp : E → Q | p ∈ P}〉, denoted 2mpg(M, p), is
thus the game 〈P, V, {Vp, V r Vp}, v0, E, rp〉. Mean-payoff games have optimal mem-
oryless strategies for both players, and the outcome when starting in any vertex v ∈ V ,
is determined [24]. By abuse of notation, we denote this value by rp(v).
3 Optimal strategy profiles
We study the question of computing optimal strategy profiles. A strategy profile is called
optimal if it is a Nash or political equilibrium and provides the maximal reward among
the strategy profiles in this class of equilibria. In the remainder, we will show that
1. political equilibria are generally better than Nash equilibria (Theorem 1),
2. determining if there is a strategy profile σ with rd(σ) = 1, such that the strat-
egy profile σ is a Nash resp. political equilibrium, is NP hard even for zero-sum
MMPGs with reward functions whose domain is in {−1, 1} (Theorem 2), and op-
timal reward of the dictator is not efficiently approximisable (Corollary 1), and
3. optimal Nash and political equilibria always exist, and, for a fixed set of players,
finding an optimal strategy profile in MMPGs is polynomial time reducable to solv-
ing 2 player MPGs (Corollary 3).
For social optima, it suffices to add a social reward to the reward function, e.g., the
sum of the individual rewards, without letting the respective player own any vertex. The
technique introduced in this paper can then be used to optimise the social payoff.
5
1 2
4
3
5
(−1, 2,−1)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 1,−2)
Fig. 1. An MMPG, where political equilibria are strictly better than Nash equilibria. The rewards
are depicted in the order first player, dictator, passive player. The rewards on the edges (1, 2),
(1, 4), (2, 3), and (2, 5) is not shown, because these edges can only be taken once in a play. Their
rewards thus have no impact on the payoff for any player.
3.1 Superiority of political equilibria
In this subsection, we show that political equilibria is in general superior over Nash
equilibria: a benign dictator who assigns strategies in such a way that she only makes
sure that no other player has an incentive to deviate, while allowing for the use of ‘mod-
est’ strategies that can be improved upon even if the other players stick to their strate-
gies, is more successful than a dictator following the more obviously egoistic approach
to chose only among strategies she cannot improve upon herself.
On first glance, it may not seem to be in the interest of the dictator to be benign. To
the contrary, it would seem that the dictator could improve upon such strategy profiles
by simply adjusting her strategy. A closer look, however, reveals that she only gets rid
of constraints, and will therefore never deteriorate and often improve her reward.
To show this, consider the MMPG from Figure 3.1. It shows a simple MMPG with
five vertices, 1 through 5, where the dictator owns Vertex 2, and a player first owns
the initial vertex, Vertex 1. The other vertices have exactly one successor (themselves),
such that it does not matter who owns them. There is a third player, player passive.
Initially, Player first can either play to Vertex 4, or to Vertex 2. When playing to
Vertex 4, every player will receive a payoff of 0. When she plays to Vertex 2, the dictator
can either move on to Vertex 3, securing herself a payoff of 2, to the cost of the first
and the passive player, who both receive a payoff of −1. Alternatively, she could play
to Vertex 5, where both the dictator and the first player receive a payoff of 1, to the cost
of the passive player, whose payoff is −2.
In a Nash equilibrium, the dictator will never move to Vertex 5, as she can improve
over such strategies by simply choosing to go to Vertex 3. Consequently, the first player
will not move to Vertex 2 in any Nash equilibrium, as this would result in a payoff of
−1 for her, such that moving to Vertex 4 is preferable. Thus, the only play produced by
a Nash equilibrium is the play 1 · 4ω .
But the dictator has a better political equilibrium: she can benignly wave her option
to move to Vertex 3, and instead move to Vertex 5. Then, it becomes preferable for the
first player to move to Vertex 2. This results in an improved reward for the dictator.
Theorem 1. Optimal political equilibria cannot be worse, but might be strictly better
for the dictator compared to Nash equilibria.
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3.2 NP hardness
In order to establish NP hardness, we reduce the satisfiability of a 3SAT formula over n
atomic propositions withm conjuncts to solving a zero-sum MMPG with 2n+1 players
and 4m+5n+2 vertices that uses only payoffs 0 and 1. We consider the reduction for
the example of the 3SAT formula (p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r) ∧ (¬p ∨ q ∨ ¬r) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r).
The 2n + 1 players consists of 2n players for the 2n literals corresponding to the
n variables, and the dictator who intuitively tries to validate the formula. The game
consists of three phases, an initial assignment phase, in which the dictator intuitively
assigns either the value true or the value false to all n variables. We use two-players
for each of the variables, one representing true, and one representing false. In a second
validation phase, the dictator intuitively validates that the chosen assignment indeed
satisfies the specification ϕ. For this, she successively steps through the conjuncts of
the 3SAT formula. For each conjunct, the dictator can select one of the three literals,
which is owned by the same player who owns this literal in the first phase. In the first
and second phase, the literal players can either continue, or move to an absorbing state.
In a final evaluation phase, the game goes round a ring of length n, where, in each step, a
disadvantage is given to one of the players of a variable, the player who represents true,
or the player who represents false. By choosing the payoff for cycling in the absorbing
state accordingly, we can assure that there is a political / Nash equilibrium with payoff
1 for the dictator if ϕ is satisfiable, and a payoff of 0 for the dictator if ϕ is unsatisfiable,
using only the rewards 0 and 1.
Assignment phase In the assignment phase, we have two types of vertices. We have
Vertices 0 through n, which are owned by the dictator and 2n literal vertices. In Vertex
i − 1, the dictator chooses either the truth value or false value of each variable Z by
either moving to a vertex zi, or moving to ¬zi, owned by the players with the respective
literal. From vertex zi or ¬zi, the respective player can choose to move to the dictator
vertex, or to an absorbing vertex abs. From the absorbing vertex abs, there is just one
outgoing transition, which returns to abs, and has a payoff of 0 for dictator and payoff
of 1 for all other players. Note that payoff at the edges that can be taken only once are
omitted as they have no effect on the overall reward of the play. The assignment phase
is shown in the Figure 3.2.
Validation phase In the validation phase, the dictator intuitively tries to validate that
her chosen assignment indeed validates the formula ϕ. Here, we have two types of
vertices. We have m dictator vertices and 3m literal vertices, z1i , z
2
i , and z
3
i for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In this phase, the dictator successively steps through the conjuncts
of the 3SAT formula. For each conjunct, the dictator selects one of the three literals,
which is owned by the same player who owns this literal in the first phase. At vertex
n + i − 1, the dictator can play to any literal vertex, to z1i , to z2i , or to z3i in conjunct
i, to validate the value of the conjunct. Further, we have the same absorbing vertex as
in the assignment phase. Here also, payoff at the edges that can be taken only once are
omitted. The Validation phase is shown in the Figure 3.3.
Evaluation phase In evaluation phase, we have 2n literal vertices and a single dictator
vertex. The evaluation phase of the MMPG resembles a ring structure. Here, the game
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cycles in a ring of length n where at every vertex one of the players is at disadvantage.
At any vertex zi resp. ¬zi, its counter-literal receives a payoff of 0 while everyone else
receives payoff of 1. The vertex owned by zi has two successors, the vertices owned by
zi⊕1 and ¬zi⊕1, where i ⊕ 1 is i + i for i 6= n, and n ⊕ 1 = 1. The vertex owned by
¬zi has the same successors as the vertex owned by zi: the vertices owned by zi⊕1 and
¬zi⊕1. The Evaluation phase is shown in the Figure 3.4.
3.3 Approximisability
Note that, for all strategy profiles σ, the reward rd(σ) is either 0 (if the absorbing state
is reached) or 1 (if the cycle in the evaluation phase is reached). In particular, the reward
is 1 if the 3SAT problem has a solution, and 0 if it does not have a solution. Unless P
equals NP, the optimal reward of the dictator therefore cannot be approximised closer
than the trivial 0.5 approximation by a tractable algorithm.
3.4 0 sum games
To progress from here to zero sum games, we can simply add a suitable number of
additional players who own no vertex. If we maintain the rewards of 1, replace the
rewards of 0 to −1, and assign a suitable number of these new players rewards of −1
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and 1, respectively, such that the sum of the rewards is 0, we obtain a zero sum game,
where the rewards of the dictator are either −1 or 1 for all strategy profiles. The non-
approximisability clearly carries over.
Theorem 2. The decision problem of whether or not a political or Nash equilibrium σ
with reward rd(σ) = 1 of the dictator exists in games with rewards in {0, 1} resp. zero
sum games with rewards in {−1, 1}, such that the reward of the dictator is always in
{0, 1} resp. {−1, 1} is NP complete.
The proof is closely related to the NP hardness proof from [23].
Corollary 1. Unless P=NP, no tractable algorithm can approximate the optimal re-
ward of the dictator closer than 0.5.
3.5 Reward and punish for political equilibria
Let us consider a strategy profile σ, which is a political equilibrium. We first show that
we can obtain a similar equilibrium by applying a punishment to the first player who
deviates from σ. The power to define the equilibrium allows the dictator to use the
power of all remaining players to punish this deviator.
That is, we use a strategy profile where all players co-operate to produce piσ . Note
that the dictator solicits co-operation from every player who owns some vertex in the
game. Further, the strategy profile σ offers the reward rp(piσ) to a player p, which is at
least as good as the reward that player p would have got in any Nash equilibria. But,
if a player deviates from σ, all other players co-operate to harm this player, throwing
their own interests to the wind. Thus, deviation from the construction of piσ will lead to
a payoff of the deviating player, which equals the payoff of this player in a two-player
game that starts at the point of her deviation, i.e., at the vertex owned by her where
she is supposed to play as per σ. We call any such strategy profile a reward and punish
strategy profile and define it as a σ that offers reward rp(piσ) to a player p and any
deviation from σ by a player p will eventually lead her to get a low payoff then rp(piσ).
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Lemma 1. If a strategy profile σ is a political equilibrium, then there is a reward and
punish strategy profile σ′, which is also a political equilibrium and defines the same
play piσ = piσ′ . If σ is Nash, so is σ′.
Proof. First we observe that piσ alone defines the reward of all players for the strategy
profile σ and thus, due to piσ = piσ′ , of σ′.
Let us assume for contradiction that a player p ∈ P for Nash equilibria resp. p ∈
P r{d} for political equilibria has an incentive to deviate from her strategy in σ′. Then
her payoff in σ′ will be determined by the result of the two-player zero-sum MPG ‘her
against the rest’ as defined by the reward and punish strategy profiles. (Note that the
initial play up to this point has no impact on the limit reward.) But she can deviate from
her strategy in σ at the same position with at least the same reward, by simply assuming
that she plays against all other players in the same game. Consequently, she has an
incentive to deviate in the strategy profile σ, too, which contradicts the assumption that
σ is a Nash resp. political equilibrium. uunionsq
This observation allows us to concentrate on reward and punish strategy profiles only.
Let ver(pi) be the set of vertices that occur in a play, and let own(S) = {p ∈ P |
S ∩ Vp 6= ∅} be the set of players that own some vertex in S. With these terms, it is
simple to characterise reward and punish strategy profiles.
Lemma 2. For an MMPGM, a play piσ is the outcome of a reward and punish strategy
profile σ which is a Nash resp. political equilibrium if, and only if, for all vertices
v ∈ ver(pi) and all players p ∈ own(ver(piσ)) resp. p ∈ own(ver(piσ)) r {d} that
control a vertex that occurs in the play, it holds that rp(piσ) ≥ rp(v).
Proof. To show the ‘if’ direction, we assume for contradiction that rp(piσ) < rp(v)
holds for some vertex v ∈ ver(pi), which is owned by p (resp. owned by p 6= d). Then
player p can improve on her strategy by following her strategy until v is reached, and
henceforth follow the strategy from 2mpg(M, p). As the initial play does not influence
the limies inferior, her payoff would be at least rp(v), which is strictly greater than
rp(piσ).  
To show the ‘only if’ direction, we assume for contradiction that rp(piσ) ≥ rp(v)
holds, but no reward and punish strategy profile defines piσ . Assume that Player p,
deviates in vertex v from piσ . Then the other players will join to diminish her payoff
henceforth. Taking into account that the initial sequence up to this point has no influence
on the limit inferior of the payoffs, they can follow the optimal strategy of the oponents
of p from 2mpg(M, p), restricting the payoff of player p to rp(v).  uunionsq
In the next step, we show that we can determine the existence of a well behaved reward
and punish strategy profile that satisfies such a constraint system. A strategy profile is
well behaved if the the ratio in which every edge occurs has a limit, that is, if, for all
edges (s, t) ∈ E, there is a r(s,t) = lim
n→∞
#(s,t)n (piσ)
n , where #
(s,t)
n (v0, v1, v2 . . .) =∣∣{i < n | (vi, vi+1) = (s, t)}∣∣ is the number of edges (s, t) among the first n edges
that occur in a play v0, v1, v2 . . .. (Recall that this limit does not necessarily exist for
general strategy profiles.)
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Linear programs for well behaved reward and punish strategy profiles. The first
central observation is that if we already know
– the set of vertices Q visited in piσ and
– a (strongly connected) set S of vertices that are visited infinitely often,
then we can infer a constraint system by Lemma 2, which is necessary and sufficient
for a well behaved reward and punish strategy profile. The constraint system consists of
two parts. One part is the ratios, where we use the p(s,t) from above for edges (s, t) ∈
E ∩S×S, and similarly pv for the limit ratio of each vertex in S. (Obviously, the limit
ratio of each vertex not in S and each edge not in S × S must be 0.)
This provides a first part of a constraint system, namely
– the ratio of vertices and edges that are not in S resp. S × S is 0,
pv = 0 for all v ∈ V r S and pe = 0 for all e ∈ E r S × S,
– the ratio of vertices and edges that are in S resp. S × S is ≥ 0,
pv ≥ 0 for all v ∈ S and pe ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E ∩ S × S,
– the sum of the ratio of vertices is 1,
∑
v∈V
pv = 1, and
– the ratio of a vertex is the sum of the ratios of its incoming and outgoing edges,
ps =
∑
t.(s,t)∈E
p(s,t) for all s ∈ S and pt =
∑
s.(s,t)∈E
p(s,t) for all t ∈ S.
The second part of the constraint system stems from Lemma 2: as rp(piσ) is simply∑
e∈E perp(e), that is, it is the weighted sum of the rewards of the individual edges, we
get the constraints ∑
e∈E
perp(e) ≥ max
v∈Q
(rp(v))
for all p ∈ own(Q) for Nash, and for all p ∈ own(Q)r {d} for political equilibria.
Before we define the objective function, we state a simple corollary from Lemma 2.
Corollary 2. Every well behaved reward and punish strategy profile satisfies these con-
straints, and every well behaved strategy profile σ, whose play piσ satisfies these con-
straints, defines a reward and punish strategy profile. uunionsq
The objective of the dictator is obviously to maximise rd(piσ) =
∑
e∈E perd(e).
Once we have this linear programming problem, it is simple to determine a solution in
polynomial time [12, 13].
The relevant points are first to establish that a well behaved reward and punish
strategy profile exists for each such solutions, and second to show that non-well behaved
reward and punish strategy profiles cannot be preferable for the dictator.
From Q, S, and a solution to the linear programs to a well behaved reward and punish
strategy profile. We start with the simple case that the vertices and edges with non-0
ratio are strongly connected.
We design piσ as follows. We first go from the initial vertex v0 through states in Q
to some state in S. (Note that this initial path has no bearing on the limes inferior that
defines the payoff of the individual players.)
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Once we have reached S, we intuitive keep a list for each vertex in S. In this list,
we keep the number of times each outgoing edges with non-0 ratio has been taken. We
also apply an arbitrary (but fixed) order on the outgoing edges. Each time we are in this
vertex, we choose the first edge (according to this order) that has been taken less often
(from this vertex) than pepv , the ratio pe of the edge divided by the ratio pv of this vertex,
suggests. If no such edge exists, we take the first edge.
The result is obviously a well behaved strategy profile and the first part of the con-
straint system is clearly satisfied. It therefore suffices to convince ourselves that the
second part is satisfied as well.
Now assume for contradiction that this is not the case. Let qv and qe be the real
ratio of the vertices and edges, respectively. Note that our simple rule for the selection
of vertices implies that pepv is correct for all edges e = (v, v
′) ∈ E ∩ S × S. Then there
must be a vertex v ∈ S, which has the highest factor qvpv . As it is the highest factor, none
of its predecessors in E ∩ S × S can have a higher ratio; consequently, they must have
the same ratio. By a simple inductive argument, this expands to the complete strongly
connected set of non-0 vertices. As
∑
v∈S pv = 1 =
∑
v∈S qv holds, this implies
pv = qv for all v ∈ S.
To extend this argument to the general case, we first observe that the non-0 vertices
and edges form islands of (maximal) SC parts C1, through Ck. We use this observation
to compose a play as follows.
We start with an initial part, a transfer from v0 to C1 as in the simple case. We then
continue by playing a C11 part, a transfer, a C
1
2 part, a transfer, . . ., a C
1
k part, transfer
C21 , and so forth. To achieve a well behaved strategy profile we do the following.
1. We fix the ratio
∑
i C
i
1 :
∑
i C
i
2 : . . . :
∑
i C
i
k according to the the sum of the pv
for vertices v in the respective component. This ratio never changes, and it is given
by natural numbers c1, c2, . . . , ck, such that c1 : c2 : . . . : ck satisfies this ratio.
2. We let Cij grow slowly with i. We can, for example, use i · cj .
Note that the transfer part has constant length, bounded by |S|. Thus the limit ratio
of transfer is 0.
3. We let the transfer to Cij+1 go to the vertex, in which C
i
j was left. Note that the
transfer may contain vertices of various components, but as the overall ratio of the
transport is 0, this does not affect the limit probability.
Thus, we can use the controller from the simple case of one SCC for the sequence
C1i , C
2
i , C
3
i . . ., which only focuses on the relevant part of the i
th component.
In effect, we have simple controllers for the individual components, and a single
counting controller that manages the transfer between the components.
It is easy to see that the resulting controller inherits the right ratios from the simple
individual controllers. Together with Corollary 2 we get:
Theorem 3. If the linear program from above for sets Q of reachable states and S of
states visited infinitely often has a solution, then there is a well behaved reward and
punish strategy profile that meets this solution. uunionsq
Finally, we show that non-well behaved reward and punish strategy profiles cannot
provide a better solution than the one provided by the previous theorem.
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Theorem 4. Non-well behaved reward and punish strategy profiles cannot provide bet-
ter rewards for the dictator than the reward rd for the dictator obtained by the well
behaved reward and punish strategy profiles described above.
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 2 that there exists a well defined constraint system
obeyed by all reward and punish strategy profiles with set Q of reachable states and all
p ∈ own(Q) for Nash, and for all p ∈ own(Q) r {d} for political equilibria. Let us
assume for contradiction that there is a reward and punish strategy profile σ that defines
a play piσ with a strictly better reward rd(piσ) = rd + ε for some ε > 0.
Let k be some position in piσ such that, for all i ≥ k, only positions in the infinity set
S of piσ occur. Let pi be the tail vkvk+1vk+2 . . . of piσ that starts in position k. Obviously
rp(pi) = rp(piσ) holds for all players p ∈ P .
We observe that, for all δ > 0, there is an l ∈ N such that, for all m ≥ l,
1
m
∑m−1
i=0 rp
(
(vi, vi+1)
)
> rp(pi) − δ holds for all p ∈ P , as otherwise the limes
inferior property would be violated.
We now fix, for all a ∈ N, a sequence pia = vkvk+1vk+2 . . . vk+ma , such that
vk+ma+1 = vk and
1
m
∑ma−1
i=0 rp
(
(vi, vi+1)
)
> rp(pi)− 1a holds for all p ∈ P .
Let pi0 = v0v1 . . . vk−1. We now select pi′ = pi0pi1b1pi2b2pi3b3 . . ., where the bi are
natural numbers big enough to guarantee that bi·|pii||pii+1|+|pi0|+
∑i
j=1 bj ·|pij |
≥ 1− 1i holds.
Letting bi grow this fast ensures that the payoff, which is at least rp(pi) − 1i for all
players p ∈ P , dominates till the end of the first iteration1 of |pii+1|.
The resulting play belongs to a well behaved (as the limit exists) strategy profile, and
can thus be obtained by a well behaved reward and punish strategy profile by Lemma
2. It thus provides a solution to the linear program from above, which contradicts our
assumption. uunionsq
Decision & optimisation procedures. The decision problem related to the construc-
tion of optimal equilibria asks whether or not, for a given threshold rthld, there exists
a strategy profile σ, which is a Nash resp. political equilibrium and provides a reward
rd(piσ) ≥ rthld for the dictator.
In Lemma 2 and Theorem 4 we have established that it is enough to consider well
behaved reward and punish strategy profiles. The relevant behaviour of these strategy
profiles is captured by the set of reachable vertices, the set of infinite vertices S, and the
ratio of the edges in E ∩ S × S.
We use this observation in various algorithms, starting with a nondeterministic one.
Theorem 5. For an MMPGM and a threshold rthld, the respective decision problem
for political or Nash equilibria is NP complete, both in the general case and when
restricted to zero-sum games with pay offs in {−1, 1}.
Proof. We use nondeterminism to guess a set Q of visited vertices, a set S of ver-
tices visited infinitely often and then the linear program defined by them and a solution
1 Including the first iteration of pii+1 is a technical necessity, as a complete iteration of pii+i
provides better guarantees, but without the inclusion of this guarantee, the pij’s might grow
too fast, preventing the existence of a limes.
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thereof. Note that the linear program is polynomial in M and, consequently, it has a
polynomial solution, too.
After having a closer look at the sets Q and S, we can check that there is a possible
path from the initial vertex to S, that S is strongly connected, that Q and S define the
guessed linear program, its constraint system is satisfied by the solution and the reward
of the dictator is at least the threshold rthld given. All of these tests can obviously be
performed in polynomial time.
The respective hardness results have been established in Theorem 6.
Although there is no perfectly fitting lemma or theorem for citing in, the inclusion
in NP could have been cited in from [23] and Theorem 5, and the techniques used there
are quite similar to ours. We re-proved it as we need the intermediate results below.
The hardness result uses a polynomial number of players. This raises a question if
the complexity is better for a bounded number of up to k players.
We first assume that we are already provided with solutions to the 2MPGs toM.
To device a decision procedure, we start with a simple observation:
Lemma 3. For a given MMPG M with k players and n vertices, there are at most
(n+ 1)k many different thresholds in the related linear programs.
Proof. For each player p, there is either the threshold rp(v) for some vertex v ofM,
or no restriction on the threshold at all in Part II of the constraint system of a linear
program. uunionsq
Consequently, we only have to consider the most liberal constraint systems.
Lemma 4. For a given MMPG M with k players and n vertices and a threshold as
referred to in the proof of Lemma 3, it suffices to refer to up to n first parts of the
constraint system of the LLP.
Proof. For each Part II of the constraint system as referred to in the proof of Lemma 3,
it is easy to determine the maximal set Q of nodes that can be visited. For this maximal
Q, we can determine the strongly connected components S1, S2, . . . of (V,E)∩Q that
are reachable from the initial vertex v0. Obviously, there are at most n of them.
It is now easy to see that, for all Q′, S′ that define Part II of the constraint system,
Q′ is contained in Q and S′ is contained in one SCC Si from above. Now Q and Si
define a more liberal Part I of a constraint system than Q′ and S′. Thus, every solution
for Q′ and S′ is a solution for Q and Si, too. uunionsq
Thus, for a given k, there are only polynomially many LLPs to consider, and they
are easy to construct. Solving LLPs requires only polynomial time [13, 12]. We thus get:
Theorem 6. If we are provided with the solutions to the 2MPGs defined by an MMPG
with a fixed number k of players, then we can determine an optimal solution in polyno-
mial time. uunionsq
Corollary 3. MMPGs with a fixed number of players can be solved in polynomial time
by a machine with an oracle for solving two-player zero-sum MPGs. If 2MPGs are
solvable in polynomial time, so are MMPGs with a fixed number of players. uunionsq
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3.6 Reduction to Two Player Mean-pay off games
Thus, finding optimal strategy profiles in MMPGs with a fixed number of players can
be derived from solutions to 2MPGs. Various works have been published on solving
2MPGs. In [6], the authors give an improved pseudopolynomial procedure to solve
two-player mean-payoff games. [2] provides a randomised strongly subexponential and
pseudopolynomial algorithm, and [11, 24] contain an UP∩CoUP reduction. There are
wilder reductions like one to symbolic linear programming [20] and a smoothed poly-
nomial time complexity [3].
Corollary 3 therefore provides:
Corollary 4. MMPGs with a fixed number of players can be solved in UP∩coUP, in
pseudo polynomial time, in smoothed polynomial time, and in randomised subexponen-
tial time. uunionsq
3.7 Making Rules in Good Cause
While the mechanism described refers to a selfish dictator, we would like to point out
that the same mechanism can be used for finding socially optimal equilibria and, more
generally, equilibria optimal for any ordered vector of payoffs.
For social optima, all one needs to do is to add a social reward to the reward
function—traditionally the sum of the individual rewards—without letting the respec-
tive player own any vertex. The technique introduced in this paper can then be used
to optimise the social payoff. Likewise, a dictator might choose to optimise her payoff
first, but take a social optimum as a secondary objective. In this case, one would simply
use the techniques discussed earlier to determine her optimal payoff, and then add this
payoff as a constraint in the second part of the constraint system. Subsequently, one
would repeat the process with the objective to optimise the social payoff. (Obviously, a
more friendly dictator might choose to reverse the order of priorities.)
This ‘optimise – add to constraint system – optimise’ technique can obviously be
generalised to an arbitrary number of objectives.
4 Discussion
The two main contributions of this paper are the introduction of political equilibria and
the concept of well behaved reward and punish strategy profiles. Well behaved reward
and punish strategy profiles are general instruments for optimising the payoff of one
player, while projecting away problems like the potential non-existence of limit average
values. It is our believe that they will be useful in many related optimisation problems.
The introduction of political equilibria is a conceptual change of Nash equilibria, where
an interested party overcomes an antinomy of Nash equilibria exemplified in Figure
3.1: the interested party (which we christianed the dictator) might improve her payoff
by choosing a strategy, which is not stable for herself in the Nash sense of not being
able to improve the payoff by unilaterally deviating from her strategy.
The solutions one obtains can be used to make stable rules that optimise various
outcomes, including social optima as well as egoistic solutions.
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